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This roundtable took place at the European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG) 
in July 2019. This abridged version has been edited for clarity, continuity and 
cohesion. The audience was informed that the roundtable discussion and Q & A 
would be recorded, transcribed2 and published. 
 
Verena Molitor (Chair): This roundtable aims to investigate how gender, as a social 
process and regime, produces gender identities, often in non-deterministic and 
unpredictable ways. The right to not be discriminated against regardless of gender 
identity may, however, clash with practices of sex/gender categorization and gender-
relevant policies of nation-states. Indeed, the attribution and registration of sex 
impacts the human rights of transgender, non-binary, queer and intersex persons. In 
bringing together expertise from political science, law, political sociology and gender 
studies, this roundtable: (1) asks how gender operates as a relation of power, 
particularly the value and possibilities of a more utopian politics of post-gender 
beyond existing identifications; (2) cultivates a discussion of the consequences of the 
systematic registration of legal sex and of sex/gender-related policies as they impact 
quality of life for queer and trans individuals, and (3) discusses theoretical and 
practical alternatives to such policies and practices. In examining relationships 
between gender as a relation of power, gender identity attribution and global justice, 
we also want to ask how non-binary genders are operationalized in policies and 
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practices of nation-states and to think critically about whether undoing formal legal 
categorization would impact the gendering of social subjects. I would like to ask 
Davina Cooper to start with some introductory words on the broad topic of our 
roundtable.  
 
Davina Cooper: If we take a feminist and critical perspective, are there good reasons 
to retain systems in which the state registers and recognises people as legally gendered 
subjects? This is the question that the research-council-funded project I’m currently 
undertaking – called The Future of Legal Gender – is asking. The project has just 
finished the first of three years. It aims to explore the challenges, implications, limits, 
but also hopes and stakes in “decertifying,” which is the term we are using, to identify 
a process in which the state steps back from assigning or confirming sex and gender 
in Britain.  
 
“Decertification” doesn’t have to mean that the state ignores questions of 
gender and equality, and that’s important. Rather, they become matters dealt with 
without people having a formal gender status. So more like how British law would 
respond to people’s ethnicity or their sexuality or religion.  
 
Underpinning this project, however, is a broader question of how should 
gender be conceptualised? And I think we’re experiencing what seems an 
unprecedented flux in gender’s conceptualisation, as dominant notions of gender as 
the ordinary life of two sexes is unsettled. So, it’s a good moment to think about, and 
perhaps intervene in, the emerging conceptions of gender that are taking hold. But 
doing so poses a series of questions. Firstly, if gender becomes understood as a social 
identity or aspect of personhood, what does this mean for feminist accounts of gender 
as a social system with asymmetrical roles, relations, and norms? Does the identity 
approach also read gender too narrowly, namely as inner feeling and outward 
expression? We might think of this as prefiguring what gender could come to mean. 
But how does it relate to broader accounts of gender, anchored in the gender division 
of labour, women’s care work, sexual violence, normative heterosexuality, and so on? 
 
Can we also still talk about gender as something that’s publicly done: the scenes 
of gender, that are staged in work places, formal politics, and shared spaces? Or has 
gender become something that corresponds entirely and only to how people self-
identify? I think that has major implications for critical politics and questions of 
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representation. Is there still a public life of gender which can’t be reduced to people’s 
own gender identity?  
 
If gender is about identity and attachment, what does this also mean for 
accounts of gender that emphasise its intrinsic relationality – that gender, as social 
categories, takes the shape from the genders that they’re not – Or does this argument 
no longer hold in a plurally gendered world, where males are no longer defined 
against females, and vice versa? Are genders differently relational, so that 
masculinities are constituted in relation to each other rather than against a contrasting 
femalehood? Or are genders no longer being constituted in contrasting, asymmetrical 
ways with any others? In some countries, are genders becoming more like ethnicities, 
perhaps defined by shared cultures and community belonging, rather than by what’s 
outside? Or does this draw too much from the development of minor or less dominant 
gender identifications, and neglect how mainstream genders continue to operate? 
 
Finally, from a critical perspective, how might we think about attachments to 
gender? What is this “thing,” gender, that we are affirming an attachment to? What if 
anything is valuable in gender to make it worth staying in relationship with?  
 
Now none of that is to discount the violent, excluding, humiliating experiences 
that non-conforming gender expressions can evoke. And, of course, what counts as 
non-conforming changes over time so this generational aspect to the debate is 
important to reflect upon. But in the discussion about gender identity, has gender 
itself become normalised? So beyond advocating for multiplicity, what does gender 
mean and do, and what can or might it mean and do, in the sense of offering, if it does 
offer, progressive resources into the future? If we can identify any positive valence in 
gender, to what extent might it be because gender is leaving or could leave male and 
female behind? Perhaps rather like religions which abandon god. 
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: For me, as a sociologist, I say: Well, my very valued political 
scientist colleagues have sometimes very normative perspectives, saying, “Okay, 
what do we do? How do we speak about gender? Can we abolish gender registration 
and if so, what will happen?” And my question is: Who still needs gender? And I 
always propose this also to my students, and my students usually hate me for that. 
But what I mean in the sense of societal structures is, it is quite possible that, people 
stick to quite conservative things not because they’re conservative. It can be that 
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institutions, policies, and organisations have a kind of integrated gender binarity, not 
because they are transphobic or intersexphobic, but just because of the resources they 
have. I had this talk with a town representative for gender equality, and I was telling 
her about theoretical considerations on the possibilities of abolishing gender 
registration, and then she said, “Oh please don’t do this! We still need gender! We just 
need to know how good we are in equality issues! We really need gender! We want to 
do something for women! And if the women are not there anymore, I cannot do 
something for them! Oh no, please stop your work!” I believe these kinds of thoughts 
and clear understandable logics are very visible in housing provisions, in gender 
equality issues, in gender pay gap registrations, and so on. So, gender is relevant in a 
structural sense, in structural means, for (in)equality. So what people are afraid of, 
and I understand why they are, is that those powers who are actually anti all these 
kinds of equality would say, “Okay, perfect. We don’t have to register it so we don’t 
have to invest in it anymore. So from now on, we don’t see these inequalities.” 
Probably this is a very utopic fear, I hope it is.  
 
Verena and I, Christine [Quinan] too, are working with LGBTIQ police officers 
and policing, and looking at things like hospitals, imprisonment, and so on, and how 
they are all organised in terms of gender. So what does it actually mean in the sense 
of resources and investing money? If at one point we say, we have to open up the 
police as well, we have to open up the hospitals, so every person who comes to a 
hospital would have a choice of having a gender-neutral or queer room to be in, and I 
would really love for this kind of thing to happen, this kind of visibility of queer lives 
and gender identities and quality of lives to be possible. But the thing is, what kind of 
actors are we dealing with? And what kind of resource logics do they have? Then they 
say, “Oh! If we open up our prisons for more than two genders, how do we manage 
it in the sense of body checks, of literally putting people somewhere – accommodating 
citizens’ bodies into somewhere?” I’m afraid that citizens’ bodies and citizens are 
more governable as long as they’re binary. I’m afraid that we really have to look at 
this kind of logic, and I propose that we look at this kind of logic not anticipating that 
all of them are LGBTIQ-phobic, but that they’re simply trying to say, “We have to save 
resources.” And the question is, what do we do for that? How do we manage to work 
with this kind of fear? If we know, for example, that the gender pay gap and 
integration into the labour market are gendered dynamics, and the actors who are 
trying to promote equality need females to be visible, we can also say, “Okay, what 
happens in the labour market for people who give birth?” So we’re not caring about 
what kind of gender they have, but we’re caring about what kind of care work they 
do. We could do this. But the issue is, saying, well, we’re not registering gender 
anymore, and as Davina said, we can restrain from recording it but still provide for 
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accommodations for all these things. And I am afraid that if we really go for it 
academically, then we will quite soon have actors saying, “Okay, let’s try,” and then 
we have to provide possibilities for bringing together the resources and the question 
of queer quality of life. For me, this is the most interesting thing to look at the moment. 
 
Verena Molitor: Thank you very much. You’ve already started to address Davina, but 
let’s keep this in mind for the discussion after we hear the others’ voices and opinions.  
 
Anna van der Vleuten: Thank you, Verena. And thank you very much for inviting me 
to this panel. Let me start by saying that I’m very new to this domain, so I have never 
worked on gender identity registration, decertification, and other practices. I’m 
learning a lot rather than bringing new knowledge right now. I have a background in 
Political Science, International Relations and EU politics. I’m looking at the topic of 
gender identity, trans, intersex issues from a perspective of norm diffusion and norm 
contestation – the way in which norms change by being contested and by being, time 
and again, reframed and gaining new understandings and new content. However, as 
I said, I’m very new to this. So I want to share some thoughts based on a project we're 
just about to start. And I’ve called my intervention “X for All.”  
 
Binary normality is based on the idea that we can divide human beings into 
two stable categories: women and men. But, as Annemarie Mol, an anthropologist, 
already decades ago asked, what is a man and what is a woman? It’s what, it’s not 
“who is a woman” or “who is a man.” Traditionally we see sex as a representation of 
the body, the medical perspective. And in political debates, as in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, about introducing a third marker or not and about gender identity 
registration, medical doctors are asked to give advice. So the medical perspective 
becomes relevant to the legal and political ones. However, which medical perspective? 
How do they distinguish between physical females and physical males? Sex as a 
spatial form – anatomy? As a hormonal system – endocrinology? As a set of 
chromosomes – genetics? What is a woman? What is a man? And what when we move 
from the physical to the psychological, to the ways in which an individual gives 
meaning to their physical being, the ways in which an individual creates an identity 
in stable or varying ways? What when we move back to the physical, and to bodies 
which cannot easily be categorised based on anatomy, endocrinology, and genetics? 
What we see is an increasing confusion and incapacity to act. There are medical 
professionals who increasingly are reluctant to practice interventions when there is no 
medical necessity. And I want to leave aside here questions of informed consent to 
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medical interventions, because that’s a different topic, but rather focus on the ways in 
which binary thinking works, and how difficult it is to change that.  
 
As part of this project we have started on norm contestations of the categories 
of sex and intersex people, we’re working with a hospital and I was assisting with one 
of their meetings. There was this “case” – sorry for the word – there were twins born, 
and one of them was not identifiable unambiguously as a boy or a girl. So the doctors 
told the parents, had told the parents before giving birth – that they should wait a few 
days before giving the name or telling the world what it was, apart from being healthy. 
And the parents were panicking, what to tell the family. And there was also a class 
issue here, they had had very limited knowledge of the language, first of all, and had 
a very low level of education and had a migrant background. So that for them 
complicated the issue, what to tell the family in Morocco. They were begging the 
doctor to immediately erase the ambiguity, so the doctors had to deal with that. And 
they worried also because they said, “Well, will these parents be able to cope with an 
intersex child? Are they able to deal with this?” So, they were reluctant, they did not 
know. So that’s this incapacity to act. And they were afraid that the parents would not 
know how to cope with all sorts of daily questions like which clothes to put on or how 
to play, which toys to give. When I was young, Legos were just building blocks, but 
nowadays Legos are very gendered, you might be aware of that. So the doctors were 
afraid that the child will be harassed in school, and so on and so forth. So this is how 
the binary normalcy kicks in. The doctors are afraid to intervene, but also afraid not 
to intervene. 
 
What does it mean, then, for this child, if these parents can put an “X” in their 
child’s identity card? That the child would have more space and time to decide 
whether they rather identify as boy, or as girl, or as neither, or as both. But if all other 
children will not have an “X,” what would that mean for this child? So why not give 
all children this option? Why not put an “X” for all? 
 
That’s how far I got in my thinking about this, and referring to how to deal with 
this at a state and a theoretical level, as Davina already introduced for us to think 
about. I think it will only work if we are able to really, truly, ‘intersectionalise’ our 
thinking, able to intersectionalise policies and in such a way that we’ll still be able to 
think through structural power inequalities based on sex/gender/identities/sexual 
orientations/so on. To really intersectionalise thinking, which would, on the one hand, 
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erase stable categories, but would, on the other hand, still enable identifying 
contextualised categories of underprivileged and privileged. 
 
Verena Molitor: Thank you very much. You already raised the question: What would 
happen, if we just have the categories or the possibility to have the X category for 
every child? As I know Christine [Quinan] is doing research on the X category and 
also in relation to border crossing, could you give us some insight into your research? 
I think this would make for a good connection.  
 
C.L. Quinan: Everything that’s been stated and asked thus far are very much questions 
I am exploring as well. But I’m approaching this topic from the specific case of border 
crossing, as border crossings are spaces where we’re asked to show proof of our 
identity – and as the same time as there have been more and more options around 
declaring one’s gender identity beyond “M” and “F”, there have also been increased 
uses of biometric technologies that rely on binary gender. So that’s where I’m coming 
from. This tension between binary gender embedded in border security technologies 
and trans and non-binary mobility. 
 
Through their reliance on biometric body-based technologies, state regimes of 
border security disproportionately, I would argue, impact trans and gender diverse 
individuals, particularly when bodies do not match the reading of security agents 
and/or the technologies themselves, like full body scanners, facial recognition 
software, and even ‘older’ biometric technologies like fingerprints – there have been 
some studies suggesting that sex can be identified in fingerprints. When bodies don’t 
match the readings of the machines or the agents as unequivocally male or female, 
security responses can be activated. So in being labelled as potentially suspicious or 
threatening, such individuals can be interrogated, detained, and humiliated, which is 
exacerbated for those experiencing intersecting forms of oppression, including racial 
and religious profiling. 
 
While this method of border management has harmful effects on those who do 
not match gender norms, it also prompts critical questions regarding the role of binary 
gender as an often-invisible structuring principle. Very recently, however, recognition 
of non-binary gender has given rise to many reforms in law and policy, which might 
on the surface appear quite progressive and might look like they could improve the 
mobility of trans and gender diverse populations. For example, Australia was the first 
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to adopt the X category as a sex/gender marker on a wide scale. There were other 
places before that (for example, Nepal), but Australia was the first to allow for this 
widely, although it is important to mention that securing this marker still requires 
obtaining medical documentation. A number of additional countries have third 
gender and non-binary possibilities, of which the X marker is the most common. Here 
in the Netherlands, for example, the first X passports were recently issued. In 
Germany and Austria, there have also been developments regarding options for 
allowing for a third gender outside the binary. While this changing landscape might 
suggest improved human rights - including the right to mobility and migration - there 
is little evidence that there has been any review of these kinds of legislative 
instruments. They have also not been immune to critique – because of course policies 
that claim to address diversity and inclusion by adding new categories could run the 
risk of identity politics-based approaches, which could, in fact, reify sex and gender 
norms. Changes to gender markers must also be thought about contextually, as 
identification documents have been used to regulate and target populations. And this, 
of course, is happening at the same time as borders are increasingly securitised and 
surveilled.  
 
Given this current climate, there are several questions that I want to pose, so 
I’ll just put them out there and we can perhaps later return to some of them. While 
border crossings can present enormous pitfalls for gender diverse populations, the 
relative abundance of global state-based legislative and policy-level changes made 
with respect to gender identity and autonomy purport to make movement easier. 
However, given that travelling and migration can be dangerous and stressful when 
one does not meet sex and gender norms, could the X be a solution, or will it 
potentially create further complications, discriminations, and exclusions? I’m thinking 
also about the fact that if it is not widely adopted, what happens when an agent 
encounters this marker? Does this sort of legal innovation work in context of people’s 
lives? How do changes to legal gender affect people’s lives on the ground? Might the 
introduction of sex and gender registration policies that more adequately represent 
non-binary bodies and identities also be seen as part of a post-9/11 surveillance 
discourse successfully closing the net around all those subjects considered as “other” 
to the modern nation-state? More generally, in this neoliberal era of individualism, 
state control, and changing notions of citizenship, what do we make of the expansion 
of gender categories and legislative and policy-related changes regarding gender 
identity and autonomy? And, my last question, what impact might they have on 
mobility, migration, and state regimes of border control? 
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Verena Molitor: Thank you very much. We’ll come back to these questions and also 
to the Australian case. But first I would like to give the floor to Alexander, just to give 
us some insight into the Russian case. This is slightly different; it is about how people 
talk about non-binary individuals in Russia and what kinds of terminology they have 
tried to find. 
 
Alexander Kondakov: Thank you very much. It is indeed weird – my presence here. 
I’m sure you know that Russia is not developing any kind of law in relation to 
recognition of genders beyond the binary system which heavily relies on, as we say in 
Russia, “traditional” understanding of gender norms. But what I want to do here is to 
offer a kind of mental experiment to look at how law deals with categories in general, 
and Russia would be an example that shows the logic of categorisation within legal 
discourse, without claiming that Russia, actual Russia and actual Russian policies, has 
anything to do with the topic here.  
 
It’s a mental experiment, and I depart from an assumption that current law and 
current legal systems or any bureaucracies for that matter actually operate based on 
categories, based on categorisations of people, and this is a very crucial element of 
legal discourse. So how does law work, when those categories are taken away, or 
when some kind of new logic is offered to be part of the system? 
 
I have two examples here to offer in this intervention. The first one is a case of 
a murder of a transgender person somewhere in Moscow and a court decision that 
has been written to deal with the case by a Russian judge there in the first instance 
court. The decision is written without any awareness of the existence of the category 
transgender – that would have really simplified the judge’s role, if he could have used 
that category to communicate what he wanted to say in his decision; it would have 
been a much easier task than what happened in the actual case.  
 
So how did this judge deal with this complexity? It turned out that law has this 
capability of contextually dealing with the issue it has taken. In that particular case, 
for example, depending on the context, the judge referred to the victim with a variety 
of different categories, for instance, as “a man,” “a woman,” “a gay person,” “a person 
with non-traditional sexual orientation,” “a boy,” “a girl,” “she,” “he,” and so on and 
so forth. Depending on what was relevant at the moment the event was happening 
and described in the court decision, the category shifted from one to another. 




Another example that I have for you to think about is the introduction of just 
one category for the whole variety of sexual identities in Russia. We have a huge 
development of something called “legal prohibition/ban of homosexual propaganda,” 
which started in 2006 with banning exactly this, the “propaganda of homosexuality.” 
Then it developed into something very different. In various regions there were laws 
introduced in relation to that. And eventually, by 2012, they arrived to the conclusion 
that what they want to ban is propaganda of “sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality, and 
transgenderism.” This kind of list of categories resembles a very commonly used 
acronym, LGBT, reinterpreted within the Russian legislators’ weird logic. These were 
regional developments – that law eventually arrived to the federal level in 2013, and 
there they had a very different approach: They decided to get rid of those categories 
because they actually promote LGBT discourse, and offered a category that has 
already been used in legal decisions before. What they prohibited was “propaganda 
of non-traditional sexual relationships.” 
 
Now, how do judges deal with this? I will give you several examples of when 
they are forced to use that category to refer to any sexual diversity. 
 
First of all, they use other legal categories that are there in the law, like “social 
group,” for example, or “sexual minority,” a very important and popular category in 
Russian law. These are very formal categories, they can also be very romantic, like in 
this case, “the court agrees with the defendant’s attorney and believes that the 
mitigating fact in this case is the fact of the victim’s amoral behaviour because he 
offered same-sex love to the defendant.” Thus “same-sex love” is also part of this 
vocabulary.  
 
“Buggery,” “sodomy” - we have a special word for that, мужеложство – men 
lying with men. Interestingly courts do use community terms also, no matter what. So 
“the victim (was) offered 10,000 roubles in return for his silence, but he rejected this 
offer saying that this could not change anything and he would still tell his relatives 
that he was a Gay.” “A Gay” here in the decision is written with a capital G, in order 
to, somehow, point out that it’s a category. Then наши, or “ours”: “He said, ‘Let’s go 
to one of ours.’” In the text, by “ours,” he meant gay community. So a lot of community 
terms. Or this: “The defendant asked him whether he was a member of LGBT society, 
and he replied he was.” So society, or community. Or derogatory terms: “Someone 
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mentioned that the victim was a passive homosexual. He decided to murder the victim 
because he hates such people.” Or “fag,” “faggot,” those were used too.  
 
The most common way is this “non-traditional sexual orientation.” But it is not 
used unequivocally. Judges still think they have to mention what it actually means. 
Like here for example: “He was a person of non-traditional sexual orientation, a 
bisexual.” Or, in a different case: “He is a bisexual, to be exact, a person with non-
traditional sexual orientation.” 
 
All these categories actually constitute a huge variety of vocabulary, of the 
language in the hands of legal professionals, even in that quite hostile and violent 
context. I just have them all here: gay, bisexual, lesbian, LGBT, social group, sexual 
minority, same-sex love, sodomy, наши, the “ours,” community, homosexual, fag, 
faggot, queer, a person with non-traditional sexual orientation... There’s a huge range 
of categories. And I think that that vocabulary even proliferates when the legislators 
try to squeeze the whole variety of people’s experiences into just one little box. As 
soon as this non-traditional sexual orientation is introduced into the law, judges feel 
obliged to explain what it means and offer this huge range of categories that they take 
not only from official and formal discourses but also from community languages.  
 
Verena Molitor: Thank you very much. Maybe we can stay with this law issue and go 
back to the case in the beginning, because as you can see it’s also now a more general 
topic. Is it important to use gender and sex categories in law? It’s a question to all of 
you, but especially to Davina and Alexander, I think. Why is it important? 
 
Davina Cooper: This is exactly the sort of question our project is asking. One thing 
that’s interesting and that struck me during the research is the difference of response 
from feminist NGOs and feminist policy makers, as opposed to feminist critical 
academics. Talking to academics, they say, “Well actually, having formal legal status 
makes very little difference. Equality law is very unsatisfactory, and there is no clear 
evidence that having a formal legal status, as opposed to an informal one, impacts on 
how effective law is as a remedial structure – as a way of dealing with – certainly not 
with gender exploitation – but even gender discrimination or inequality; it’s marginal. 
But what feminist policy makers and feminist NGOs do see it is more effective – more 
effective in a remedial way – in terms of generating data to suggest it. And then there’s 
the whole issue of single sex provision, and how you deal with that in a self-
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determination framework. We can discuss that; I think it’s an interesting issue. And 
that’s where a lot of the debate in Britain has ended up focusing. In a way, it has 
become a question of collective self-determination of a group to say, we get to decide 
who belongs in our group; and whether that’s acceptable or not; and when it might be 
acceptable.  
 
Alexander Kondakov: Well, I guess there are many instances where law does help to 
address very specific, very important issues of justice, and even helps to first articulate 
and formulate those problems and issues, and then maybe to certain extent restores 
that justice or provides some kind of remedy. But it’s true that there are more and 
more people, more and more voices raised, saying that law doesn’t provide the justice 
we need, or law doesn’t provide the justice we want. And what is the response of state 
bureaucracies to these kinds of voices? Usually, it’s “Okay, let’s change the law.” Or 
“Let’s make it better. Let’s try to address your concerns.” And I don’t think that it 
really helps. I mean, we can fix some small issues, we can fix some texts, but the larger 
question still remains unaddressed, and the larger question is: Are there other ways 
of dealing with injustices rather than law, ways which would also be effective in 
addressing those injustices in gender and sexuality domains but also in other domains, 
too. And what are those social institutions that can deal with those injustices more 
effectively than law? Law, current law at least, is an invention of modernity, that 
probably is not there anymore, maybe we find ourselves in a different society now 
that is less categoric, that is more fluid and flexible. So what would be a new institution 
that could deal with that complexity? Of course, I have no answer to that.  
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: Can I say just one thing? I believe it’s also really a question of 
wording because, as you know, in Germany this third category was introduced into 
the law, and one of the results of this – and this is what I want to ask – is that, for 
example, every job application of Germany, or every job position announced, has to 
be announced as open to male, female, and diverse. Because German professions 
usually are very gendered in their naming, they want to make sure that everybody 
feels free to apply. For sure it makes visible that there are more than two genders, but 
at the same time, the wording “diverse” directly others everybody who is not male or 
female, right? So, everybody is free to apply, the males and females and the others. 
The question is: Is it good because it makes this visible and it makes people see “We 
are wanted in our professional qualifications so we feel open to apply,” or does it 
again make visible this othering in every job announcement and you see ‘German 
Railways is looking for new people for this and this job, and we’re looking for all these 
three (genders).’”? We even had a friend who is a lawyer, and they are looking for a 
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new lawyer for the agency she works for. And she asked us, “We’re looking for all 
three of them. How do we name it? How do we say this?” So, what did this law 
actually produce? And for what? 
 
C.L. Quinan: I have a question about that as well because, of course, in the German 
case the X is very limited and is only used in special cases for intersex individuals. So, 
I would also wonder what kind of effects this might have in terms of other people who 
might not identify as intersex, but say, in terms of gender as well, who might identify 
as non-binary or something beyond male and female or man and woman. So, I wonder 
also what kinds of impacts that would have. But I want to return to the question that 
Anna asked us to think about: Could we imagine a world in which X is for all? And 
this also links to this question of decertification. Maybe you thought I was sceptical of 
the X, which in some ways I am, but I also see great potential in it, and I would love 
to imagine a world in which that is the marker. But right now, there are so many 
restraints and constraints on it – I’m specifically interested in passports, and right now 
in the sex/gender field, there’s only M and F – and X in a handful of places. You cannot 
leave it blank. So, X could be a solution. But right now, because there are so few cases 
of this that it puts people that hold that marker in a situation that is potentially 
uncomfortable. 
 
Anna van der Vleuten:   Like the example of German railways and the “m/f/d,” on the 
one hand it’s about this making visible, “yes, we acknowledge there is more to the 
world than m and f,” and if you would leave it out and just not mention it, then the 
danger is – I should point it out already – that the default option, again, becomes male, 
then we are back to where we do not want to go back to. So, it is on the one hand how 
to not silence, how to make visible diversity, but then on the other hand how to avoid 
categorisation in one way or the other, or in very intelligent ways as the Russian 
judges did. So, on the one hand, how can we prevent the default option becoming 
again standard, male, and the other thing is what would empower, what empowers 
more: making visible? And in what way? What empowers? 
 
Verena Molitor: Maybe we can give the question to all of you. It’s very interesting 
because if we were to have the X for everyone, everyone is equal, but this would not 
be the case. This is a big problem. Because then there might be this male standard. 
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Anna van der Vleuten:   Because that was the reason in the first place why they started 
adding first the F.  
 
Audience Member 1: I’m working on intersex rights in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. I just wanted to add, because it’s exactly about this point regarding what 
empowers. I’ve also found evidence of intersex organisations in Germany who 
actually found that parents feel more pressured by the third category and that this 
third category actually scares them. Like the example that you named, there are many 
examples of this hospital situation where it's this sense of urgency and that this 
category “undetermined” or “diverse” or whatever the term actually pressures the 
parents more into choosing a male or female label that might not fit at all, and also 
pressures them more into surgical interventions that aren’t necessary. So, it can have 
actually very far-reaching consequences, negative consequences, this third option. I 
just wanted to add that. 
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: Returning to Anna’s comment about X for all, my question 
would be if the X might become a marker of class. In other words, what kinds of 
parents would have the capital to allow this for their child. What sort of education 
level and knowledge about gender or knowledge about the legal possibilities would 
one need to have to access this marker? 
 
C.L. Quinan: What if the X was required for all?  
 
Davina Cooper: It would take all the meaning away from the category so then you 
don’t have it. There is a Canadian case in British Colombia, where the parent didn’t 
want to gender their baby legally and so were trying to keep sex off their birth 
certificate. So, there are a few parents who are doing that despite, as you say, the 
minoritised position of those refusing. But coming back to your question, which I 
think is a really important one: What empowers? One way of looking at it is to go back 
to Nancy Fraser’s account of a politics of redistribution, and a politics of recognition; 
and whether this debate over gender has got very focused on a politics of recognition, 
at the expense of thinking about redistribution of resources and power. And in terms 
of what law can do, which I think picks up your point, Alex, it could reconstitute the 
sort of the systemic dimensions of a society, in terms of how it’s organised. The choice 
is currently being framed between do we have a plurality of social identities and 
categories where the state provides the categories and recognises the identities, or 
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should it withdraw them all. And then the risk is, if the state no longer engages, does 
it just replicate the status quo where the dominant gender becomes the norm? What 
you need at the same time are those state policies or changes that allow the normative 
and structural aspects of inequalities to be tackled. I think when you route too much 
through identity categories you get into fights about boundaries and fights about 
categories, when the issues are actually more about social inequalities. Should we then 
focus on social inequalities rather than the groups they’ve been customarily aligned 
with? In Britain, some of the care policies and policies around reproduction can use a 
gender neutral-language. But there are tensions because some people aren’t happy 
about taking out the gender categories to talk about carers or people who’re pregnant; 
it’s very contested.  
 
Verena Molitor: But do you think, all of you also, do we first have to change language? 
Because I talked about this to a social linguist who said, yes, you can talk about this 
topic and put it into law and everything, but it all starts with the language we use. I’m 
not sure. What do you think about this? Because I’m also interested in all these 
linguistic issues so I think first of all maybe we have to change language, because with 
language we start to articulate these categories, and this is the beginning, the starting 
point. 
 
Davina Cooper: My feeling is that there isn’t one right starting point. Language does 
things and it’s important but I don’t think it is where things start, but we wouldn’t say 
somewhere else is where it starts. I don’t think the problem is this notion that there is 
one social practice that’s determinative or one structure that’s determinative rather 
than seeing them as multiple entry points really. Concepts and terms can be very 
capacious. At one time, refusing to disavow womanhood as a subordinate, devalued 
social category meant the category “woman” was being stretched and moved in a 
whole range of directions so that women could be anything: butch, independent, 
physically assertive, confident and so on. Now people are creating a plurality of 
categories to identify lots of different kinds of gender expression, but materially social 
lives in question may not be much different. The terms are different. The fights are 
over the terms. So, I don’t think you need necessarily new languages as the only way 
of reimagining or redoing social life, it’s just one dimension. 
 
Anna van der Vleuten: To your point about how important language is, I think we all 
agree. However, on the other hand, I think it becomes very much a legal issue because 
the law fixes, it uses the category, it uses the language, and it looks as if meaning is 
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fixed, whereas in political discourse it is not fixed, but it is remade time and again. 
And then the question is how do politics and law relate to each other? To what extent, 
for instance, are judges who are doing the interpretation able to give new meaning to 
the words, or are they just very clumsily trying to get around them? Also, law, of 
course, is limited, in the sense that it is very well able to deal with individual cases as 
far as they fit the law in one way or the other. However, law cannot deal with 
structural inequalities, that’s beyond the law, and that’s where things get trickier 
because then also, as you pointed out, class issues come in, which then links back to 
language and to different capacities also to express, like the parents in the example I 
gave. So, the limitations we have or the possibilities and resources we have are 
different and there is a class issue to that.  
 
Verena Molitor: So maybe it’s only then shifting problems, right? 
 
Anna van der Vleuten: Yes, I think that’s what we are worried about also. 
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: As you were speaking about language and about judges, I was 
thinking of a presentation we heard yesterday [during the ECPG conference], where 
official authorities approach NGOs to define who is LGBTIQ in order for the 
authorities to make a decision on refugee cases. My question is – and all of us, we are 
speaking about different types of experts – Anna, you were speaking about medical 
experts. All of us who do research on border crossing know that somebody has to 
decide which body is, well, fitting enough in order to be able to cross the border, and 
for border crossing there are a lot of issues. But the question is, in all of our cases, who 
is it who will be asked as an expert in order for certain policies, laws, and so on to be 
put into practices? Because I believe, academically, we all have great ideas, but then 
certain individuals in certain positions have to make decisions that affect lives. And 
people who have to make decisions in health provisions say, “But the person is a 
woman”. And sometimes I hear these arguments like, we need binarity because breast 
cancer is an important thing for women and if we don’t have the category of women, 
we could not provide for this group of people so that they get medical necessities, 
prevention therapies and prevention examinations in order for breast cancer to be 
detected as early as possible. And the argument is that for that we need the gender 
binary. So, the question is, who are actually the experts? Are we the experts? 
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Alexander Kondakov: It’s a great question. I just wanted to point out that we are of 
course the experts, but also we are in this very privileged and important position of 
working in universities and educating those people who will go there and implement 
law and regulations, and not all people who enforce the law or other kinds of 
regulations go to universities, but definitely so far most of the things that are out there 
in the world were at a certain point produced in a university. Maybe it’s not the case 
anymore, maybe there is knowledge production that is happening outside of 
university walls. But we still have some role in it, and we are also getting to a point 
when we are encouraged to exchange more and more between different disciplines, 
which is also very important here. We have already touched upon so many different 
issues and different fields, not only law but medicine and policing and border control, 
registration, management, state administration, all these kinds of things. I guess a 
conference is like that, it should help to advance those kinds of knowledges and then 
go and educate those people who will go and enforce regulations in different ways. 
This is a job of very concrete specific people who sit in the courtroom, who sit in a 
window at border control and check compliance of bodies that appear in front of them 
against regulations that someone created at a certain point. That person hopefully is 
educated by us. 
 
Verena Molitor: I would like to ask Christine about this – because you also raised the 
question of border crossing – and you had conducted some interviews in Australia. 
Can you give us maybe some insights into how does it work there in terms of border 
crossing and also authorities when they are confronted with such cases?  
 
C.L. Quinan: I have to state that in Australia, although I did speak with police, I didn’t 
speak with border agents. I was largely interviewing people who either have an X in 
their passport and other identity documents or who are seeking to change their 
documentation to X. Of those people who have an X, not all of them have yet to travel. 
For many it was also a statement, an activist stance that they are taking in choosing to 
have an X. But as I mentioned before, Australia does require a medical declaration, 
which also becomes a class issue, in having access to a GP or therapist who is willing 
to sign off on this form that then needs to be sent to the passport office. So that’s 
something to really consider. This is, however, not the case in all places. For example, 
in New Zealand the X is permitted by self-declaration. As far as those who have 
travelled with X, no one I spoke with has had any serious issues such as being barred 
entry. But there’s such little data at this point so conclusions cannot yet be drawn. I 
also did a set of interviews prior to this that involved speaking with trans- and 
nonbinary-identifying individuals about their experiences in border crossings, and 
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they very regularly have experienced issues, whether in terms of body scanners or 
agents asking “why doesn’t this document match who I see in front of me?”  
 
Anecdotally speaking, one thing I will say that when arriving in Australia, I 
was quite surprised that I never even had to speak with a border agent. This border 
crossing is facilitated entirely through machines. At least for some passports this is the 
case. So, in a sense, you don’t even encounter a person if you have a machine-readable 
passport from a select group of nations. There is, however, facial recognition in place 
at that machine, which itself comes to function as the border, that checks the passport 
against the holder. And that is all done through biometric technology. But that’s 
another question, and one for which I’m currently examining the gender-related 
aspects. 
 
Verena Molitor: Thank you. Maybe we can open up the floor for comments and 
questions. 
 
Audience Member 2: I want to follow up with your [Verena’s] question about 
language. I’m sort of in between cultures. I think that language has much to do with 
culture. I just remember when my second child was getting a name in Germany, his 
second name was sort of not clear whether it was a boy or a girl’s name, then I had to 
go back to prove that it was a male name. And this doesn’t happen in the US. So, I 
think that culture is very much part of that. And that made me start thinking about, 
what kind of cultures do we know of that have more than two genders? What cultures 
could we look at to see how they deal with this situation that we are dealing with? 
Maybe there’s some answers there. 
 
Davina Cooper: As I understand it in some places there have been long traditions or 
histories of other genders, but in the colonial and postcolonial situation, it’s become 
very institutionalised and disciplined. I think India has introduced – other people here 
know more than me – but India has introduced recognition of a third gender. I don’t 
think it’s a kind of transformative approach to gender in general. 
 
Audience Member 2: But what did they do beforehand? I mean, we have to look pretty 
closely. 




Davina Cooper: Pre-colonial. 
 
Audience Member 2: Yes. How did they deal with that? Or what was it in that culture? 
 
Davina Cooper: I guess that goes to a bigger question about what is the role of state – 
of status really. I’m coming from the British context but what, if anything, do you want 
to exist as a legal status, whether it is spouses’ status or your national status or your 
sex? There are abolition movements around all of those things, and if you abolish all 
forms of status-based recognition or status-based rights, privileges, disadvantages, 
immunities and so on, then the challenge is – coming back to your question – how do 
you avoid the neoliberal context of, you know, becoming just a resource really, a 
circulating resource. Moving away from status seems a good thing in lots of ways, 
particularly if it’s about elective identities and fluidity, and if people can widely access 
it so it’s not concentrated in a few privileged people who can create this self-realised 
life. What are the social conditions in which this is happening? In another way it comes 
back to your question about language, which comes first? You can say nothing really 
comes first, it’s all kind of co-constituting. But if we are talking about abandoning 
certain forms of status in quite conservatively neoliberal conditions, how is that then 
going to be played out? Can it be played out in progressive ways rather than 
reactionary ways? What might make that possible? 
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: I would also say that it goes even further in this kind of cultural 
sense, in which states actually want to include this in an ID document. For example, I 
don’t know whether you’ve ever seen the Russian passport. You don’t only have your 
registration and your gender for sure, but you have a stamp with every marriage you 
ever started, a stamp if you also have been divorced, and all of your children are 
included. So, every police officer who controls you knows everything about your 
marital status and your family. And in Germany, you could date somebody for ages 
and then you might eventually learn that this person is married, but in Russia you just 
have to take out this person’s passport while they sleep and look in it and you know. 
But it’s also the question why it happens and why it happens like this. And my 
question is what happens if a person with an X marker enters a country with no 
possibility for a visa application for a third gender. We crossed the Russian border a 
couple of months ago, and you really had to state that you are male or female, and 
Verena just forgot to do it and the officer came back and said, “I’m so sorry ma’am, 
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could you please tell us what you are? Because otherwise you’re not allowed to enter 
the country.” Then legally, being neither male nor female, you would be forced to lie 
in visa application documents, you would be forced to violate the visa regime before 
you enter the country. So how does that work? 
 
C.L. Quinan: Many nations have said they will not deny a visa application if there is 
a mismatch between the passport marker and the marker that’s in the visa application. 
I can’t say for everywhere. There is only one country that I know of that specifically 
states that you cannot enter with a nonspecific gender marker, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). So, for Australians with X in their passports, it states on the 
Australian government’s travel advisory page, “you cannot enter the UAE with an X 
in your passport.” But there are also stories about people who have wanted to travel 
to Mecca for their pilgrimage and were denied visa applications, specifically for the 
Umrah. So, there is an issue in this respect – I think this also speaks to questions of 
undertaking, say, religious-based migration or economic-based migration, it’s those 
who are perhaps already vulnerable because of intersecting forms of oppression who 
are being denied such possibilities in these cases. 
 
And another important thing is that there is a logistical issue in terms of airlines 
as well. We are almost always asked to identify as “male” or “female” when 
purchasing a ticket. In Australia you are typically given another option (such as X). 
When I can, I will use a neutral form of address and fortunately I can say “Dr” – and 
in my fieldwork, I spoke with people who don’t have a doctorate or any degree for 
that matter, but still use this neutral form of address. As a sidenote, I was flying 
recently and upon choosing “Dr”, it actually forced me to select “Dr” (male) or “Dr” 
(female). Clearly, these ideas about gender are very much built into the system! 
 
Audience Member 3: I also have a question about passports. There are countries like 
India with the Hijra or in Thailand the Kathoey that have a long tradition of 
historically and culturally accepting this third gender or sex. Do you know how they 
happen to deal in terms of law with this third sex in passports?  
 
C.L. Quinan: For the most part, they can elect to have an X if the nation allows for it 
as is the case in India, for example. Passports are regulated by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), so any member state – and there are almost two 
hundred member states in the ICAO – can choose to allow their citizens to have X in 
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their passports, but only a handful of places in the world, say ten or so, have allowed 
for that, India being one. In some places, any gender diverse people, including trans, 
intersex, and non-binary individuals, seeking to update their documents will be given 
an X. So, there’s no choice involved. So that’s also a question to think about – when is 
this forced by the state, and when can you actually elect that?  
 
Audience Member 4: This is all very interesting and engaging. I’ve been recently 
studying the situation in Argentina and how they are dealing with non-binary 
registrations in different fields of the law, also criminal law. And although the gender 
identity law in Argentina is binary – you can change your sex from one to the other, 
with no need for any kind of medical or psychological or any type of report – it’s still 
binary. But there have been cases in which people who do not identify with the binary 
opted for a neutral form. And they have been granted an ID with no statement of sex. 
So it’s left blank, it says nothing. But it’s only at the registry level. Every other 
implication which is very gendered in the different fields of law, for example, labour 
law, retirement ages are still different for men and women. So, we’ll recognise it, it’s 
the recognition phase, but in the practice of implementation, this has very specific 
consequences.  
 
You were talking about jails, that’s also an issue, because they really don’t 
know where to place non-binary people, and it’s a big issue, because also the trans 
community is facing criminalisation, and the number of trans people in jail because of 
drug dealing, for example, is very high. So, it’s really an issue of where to place them. 
And another difficulty is that there are very specific hospitals which deal with the 
intersex population. So, every intersex child is flown over from any place in the 
country to that specific hospital. And there is no medical history accessible to intersex 
people. So, I think it goes beyond sex recognition to bodily history that you may need 
for health consequences. When we think about how we bring this into practice, I 
wonder whether we can talk of law and whether a law can erase gender registration, 
or we should actually start by looking at different fields in law, criminal law, labour 
law, and property law. For property law in Argentina, for example, we still register 
whether you are married or not because that would have implications in terms of your 
property. So. there are these different layers.  
 
Davina Cooper: What you are saying is really interesting. And in a way, the fact our 
project emerged and is focused on the jurisdiction of England and Wales is partly 
because there’s been such a movement towards gender neutrality in every area of 
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statutory law, that you can then ask the question actually: What work, if anything, is 
having a legal sex/gender doing? But of course, even in a country like Britain where 
you could decertify sex/gender so that people are no longer the bearers of legal sex or 
gender, and statutory law no longer explicitly genders them, you’ve got this massive 
edifice of case law, and you’ve got statutory interpretation, you’ve got all sorts of 
things, governmental circulars, guidance, secondary legislation. So, you’ve got this 
huge wider edifice which has got this endless long history of inscribing sex and gender 
into it in all sorts of ways. So, one of the things that interests me is, what then happens 
to that edifice when it’s then presented with these legally non-gendered bodies and 
people? How does that legal edifice re-gender them and how might that edifice shift 
if courts can’t make legal assumptions about people’s sex or gender? Except that they 
may need to, in certain contexts – in Britain, although you don’t have a legal religion, 
if you want accommodation by your employer so that you can pray at certain times, 
the state or law will then, in fact, be recognising your religion, but it’s largely based 
on you saying, this is my religion, this is what I need to do, and then there’s the 
question, has the employer accommodated you as far as they should legally? And then 
that raises the question about opportunistic entering of categories. Some people say, I 
need to pray eight times a day, or – no, they need to do it in a way that’s recognised 
for some faiths, but is it about a matter of saying, this is the faith I am? Do you need 
to show a kind of community recognition that you are in that faith? Do you need to 
show a history or some length of time of being in that faith? At one place where it has 
played out in Scotland, it’s kind of copying off television really. The American 
television series Orange is the New Black had this story of someone claiming to be 
Jewish in order to get better food, and that then happened, according to the media, in 
a prison in Scotland where the prisoners said, we are Jewish, we want kosher food, 
because kosher food was seen as being better quality. So, it was kind of a sensible 
move. And there was no legal edifice that said there was anything required to prove 
that you were Jewish in this context because nobody had ever thought of people 
opportunistically claiming to be Jewish in the prison. I don’t know how this ended up, 
but these things are emergent and changing – which of the categories, in what 
contexts, seem to carry things that might be preferable for particular people? 
 
Alexander Kondakov: I just wanted to say that, you know I have a dream, the dream 
is that there will be different commissions in different countries assembled and they 
will sit down, they will look at all those issues, and really get to details of how can we 
– regardless of what the law was before the gathering of that commission – how can 
we write a different piece of legislation in relation to those specific things, like jails, 
shared property, or pensions. For example, like for pensions with different ages, I 
think it’s not the case anymore in European Union, right? But in Russia for example 
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and in the Soviet Union, that very same legislation still exists and was enacted only to 
acknowledge that women have double shifts, they work their job on the market and 
then they go home... and they have to work again. So, the Soviet legislators thought, 
“Okay, let’s give them five years more of pension.” And it’s still there in current 
legislation, though they’re aiming at abolishing that rule. But is it a good thing? Was 
there a commission gathered? Did they really think about it? Did they address that 
particular issue? Was there any intervention made? Now people do things that way, 
at least in Europe. In Russia, of course, it’s said that it’s very different but of course 
they look at Europe and they copy more or less everything that is happening here. So, 
I think that’s more or less the idea. People have to really sit down and address it. You 
actually are already doing it in England and Wales and probably Scotland. 
 
Davina Cooper: It really follows on what you are saying, that then what are the 
mechanisms that get used to deal with some difficult areas? What you are seeing in 
Britain is that privacy rationalities become a way of managing different kinds of 
bodies in the changing rooms or toilets. You create these private stalls. Or in the 
context of different bodies in women’s prisons, risk assessment is used. In sports 
there’s talk of focusing on mainly capabilities or capacities. In other contexts, 
questions of where does decision-making authority lie? How does it get redistributed? 
All these criteria and principles are emerging as ways of dealing with the challenging 
issues around moving to a self-determination framework. But are they also 
problematic, relying on privacy to do work? Or relying on risk assessment? That’s the 
kind of – whether it’s the meta level or the next level of where reflection is. The 
principles that are being brought in may not be good principles to then embed and 
give a lot of weight to. From a critical perspective, you don’t necessarily want privacy 
to be the solution to the question of mixed bodies, or bodies in proximity. 
 
Tatiana Zimenkova: Thank you very much again for your question because it shows 
us how interdisciplinary the problem is, and how many aspects we would forget if we 
would not collaborate on this in an interdisciplinary way. 
 
Audience Member 5: Listening to what you were saying earlier next to some other 
things, it really brings up debates about racial and ethnic statistics gathering. I’m 
familiar with friends in the United States primarily and those are sort of stereotypical 
comparative cases, where in one situation it is illegal to gather statistics, in a colour-
blind society, which leads to all kinds of policy problems in terms of measuring 
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inequality. I wonder if you thought about how that issue of race and ethnicity informs 
some of your work, if at all. 
 
Davina Cooper: I think you are right. It’s an interesting challenge. Except – and it’s an 
argument that’s often made by feminists who say we need constant, consistent data, 
we need consistent categories over time, otherwise how do we understand inequality. 
But I think two things: One is that, in reality, people are self-identifying in data 
collection because they aren’t being required to produce evidence to “prove” their 
status. There’s a second point about which are the categories that are relevant or 
valuable at any given moment and these will shift? I also think that the categories that 
you use that show the starkest representation of the problem may not be the best way 
of generating data that show what to do about it. So, if you say, well there’s still the 
gender pay gap after so many decades of having legislation, might it be interesting to 
see what happens to people who identify as non-binary or agendered or trans in terms 
of pay, in terms of how their pay shifts? Might we learn anything from that? So, I think 
different kinds of data do different kinds of work. What’s your feeling in terms of 
what you might learn from collecting ethnically based data, which in Britain is 
completely self-identified, the categories themselves can be deeply problematic? 
 
Audience Member 5: Absolutely. I mean I don’t have the solution or – I actually don’t 
have many clear thoughts about it, but it was just something that struck me. But, also, 
it’s different, right? Often times those categories are not on passports or are not 
necessarily required to cross borders, although they are used to make other decisions 
in more tacit ways. Because the data part is different than research, like you said, it 
depends what context we are using it in, and it’s generally self-determined. But your 
point about trans really does make sense to me too because there is plenty of research 
to suggest that people who transition to male even visibly get many of the benefits of 
male privilege, including a bump in salary, you are listened to at talks, whatever.  
 
Anna van der Vleuten: I absolutely agree. And, also, I would add to use the word 
intersectionality again. I know that the European Institute for Gender Equality has 
started to try and use in an intersectional way, also this gender pay gap or many other 
of those issues, it is not simply about men and women and the other, because that then 
also has all sorts of privileges and differences within those categories. According to 
me, if you really want to, from a policy maker’s point of view, if you really want to 
change something about that, or from an activist point of view, if you wanted to 
problematise this, then you need a different type of data. So, this would also have to 
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do with your comment upon the limits of racial or ethnic statistical gathering. So yes, 
we would need data in order to uncover structural inequalities; however, the data 
does not mean to have those fixed categories. 
 
Verena Molitor: Maybe we should take the last question. Unfortunately, time is almost 
up. 
 
Audience Member 6: Maybe it’s a misplaced question but still I wanted to ask if you 
are willing to reflect a little bit on how LGBT rights play into international inequality, 
and how then there’s a whole re-installment of the idea of hierarchical states, some are 
more developed already and have the X and others wouldn’t even allow people with 
an X to enter the country. If I’m making sense, there’s a whole global imaginary as 
well, some countries are ahead of the game, more developed, and then how does that 
also recolonise in a way what is the right way to do it. So somehow this plays into 
what you were saying about the dream and having different committees, even though 
the idea of committees is also an interesting one. It goes with the idea of a really 
individualised way of framing the issue as well, and maybe how LGBT rights would 
relate to collective rights, how it has been pushed forward especially in Latin America.  
 
C.L. Quinan: I think we should be cognizant of how the language of “LGBT” and 
“trans” is exported and put onto different populations that would not necessarily have 
otherwise been seen under the category of “transgender”. But in terms of the places 
that allow for the X, it is an assortment of countries that you might not expect to find 
together: Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Malta, Canada, 
Denmark, and in very specific cases in other places, including in the Netherlands. So, 
I think in some ways, this is reordering what we might think of as the “progressive” 
locations, that is, who is setting the agenda for acceptance of gender diversity. In fact, 
Nepal was the very first place to allow for the X.  
 
Alexander Kondakov: I would just say that by committees I mean anarchist 
assemblies. This is one thing. And, of course, it’s such a weird thing that we map 
countries in relation to some unknown and very phobic criteria of how they deal with 
LGBT populations within their boundaries without acknowledging a lot of other 
intersectional inequalities that they have that influence their LGBT populations, too. 
And especially knowing the fact that the major share in measuring those kinds of 
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things and colouring the world map in different colours is if you recognise or not 
same-sex marriage, which is just one thing in the very complicated lives of people.  
 
Verena Molitor: Thank you to the panel. Thank you for listening and being such a 
great audience. And hopefully we all stay in touch to discuss such important issues. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
